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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellant, 
vs. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Petitioner/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040360-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004) grants the Utah Supreme Court 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The district court erred in ruling that the Division of Finance's 
administrative rule providing a retainer to cover costs of counsel and reasonable litigation 
expenses conflicts with the governing statute. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Drake 
v. Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 
UT 36,1 17, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203; Taylor ex rel. C. T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, f 6,977 
P.2d479,480. 
2. It is reasonable and rational for the Division of Finance to provide, by 
administrative rule, procedures for the time and manner of making payments to cover 
costs of counsel and reasonable litigation expenses as required by the governing statute. 
An agency's interpretation of the operative provisions of statutory law it is 
empowered to administer must be rational and is set aside only if it is imposed arbitrarily 
or capriciously or is beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Associated General 
Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ffif 18-19, 38 P.3d 291; 
Williams v. Public Service Comm 'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988). 
3. The district court erred in ordering the Division of Finance to pay for 
transcripts that petitioner failed to have transcribed and included as part of the record in 
his petition for Rule 60(b) relief, and for transcripts that are irrelevant to claims he wishes 
to pursue on appeal. 
The interpretation of statutes and rules is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Rushton v. 
Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, ^  17, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203; Taylor ex rel CT v. Johnson, 
1999 UT 35, t 6, 977 P.2d 479, 480. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The full text of the following determinative statute and administrative rule 
pertinent to the issues before the Court is attached as Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004) 
Utah Administrative Code R. 25-14-1 to 6 (2002) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal stems from a May 10, 2004, district court ruling that portion of an 
administrative rule promulgated by the Division of Finance (the "Division") is 
inconsistent with the governing statute. (R. 3904-3909). Although Menzies's 
("petitioner") case has a long history, most of its proceedings are irrelevant to this appeal 
In short, on March 8, 1988, a jury convicted petitioner of capital murder and kidnapping 
in the death of Maurine Hunsaker. See generally State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 396 
(Utah 1994) cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). Judge Raymond Uno sentenced 
petitioner to death. Id. After the Utah Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction, 
he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief. (R. 1-37). 
Ultimately, the district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, dismissed 
petitioner's petition, and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration. (R. 2237-63; 
2399-2400). Petitioner has appealed the dismissal of his petition. (R. 3913-14) 
On February 9, 2004, petitioner moved the trial court to order the "State of Utah" 
to pay for a the deposition transcript of Edward Brass, petitioner's prior legal counsel. 
(R. 3659-60). Later, petitioner moved to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel for his appeal 
and to require the "Government" to pay for transcripts, printing, and costs for appeal. (R. 
3790-91). 
Judge Pat Brian granted petitioner's motions to pay for the Ed Brass deposition 
transcript, to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel for appeal, and to require the 
"Government" to pay for transcripts, printing, and costs for appeal. (R. 3904-09). The 
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court ruled that the Division's administrative rule providing payment of a retainer to 
cover both costs of counsel and litigation expenses is inconsistent with the governing 
statute. (R. 3908-09.) Judge Brian signed a final order consistent with his memorandum 
decision on May 10, 2004. (R. 3927-29). 
The Division filed a notice of appeal on April 26, 2004. (R. 3919-21). Petitioner 
filed a notice of cross-appeal, and requested preparation of over 30 transcripts and 
"designation of records." (R. 3917-18; 3924-26). The Division responded and objected 
to petitioner's transcript request. (R. 3935-40). The Division argued that most of the 
requested transcripts were irrelevant to this appeal and were excessive given the issue on 
appeal. (R. 3935-40). Petitioner moved to strike the Division's Response and Objection. 
(R. 3941-42). 
Prior to ruling on petitioner's motion to strike, the Utah Supreme Court considered 
and ruled upon the State's motion to strike petitioner's designation of record in the related 
post-conviction appeal (Case No. 20040289-SC). (Addendum "B"). The Supreme Court 
denied the State's motion in part and granted it in part and ruled that "[t]he State shall be 
required to provide a transcript for each hearing described by affidavit to be submitted by 
[petitioner's] counsel to the district court." Id. The affidavit was required to specify the 
manner in which each hearing was referenced during the Rule 60(b) proceedings and its 
relevance to those proceedings. Id. Based on this ruling, Judge Brian, in this case, 
ordered petitioner's counsel to file an affidavit as detailed and ordered by the Utah 
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Supreme Court, and to file an amended request for transcripts and designation of record. 
(R. 3995-98). Although petitioner did file the affidavit as ordered by the Supreme Court 
in the post-conviction case, she has not filed an affidavit nor amended request for 
transcripts and designation of record in this case. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004) (the "statute") provides that in post-
conviction appeals of death penalty cases the "[cjosts of counsel and other reasonable 
litigation expenses incurred . . . shall be paid from state funds by the Division according 
to rules established" pursuant to the Utah Rulemaking Act. Accordingly, the rule 
promulgated by the Division provides that all legal counsel agree to accept for "legal 
services performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts provided in the Schedule of 
Payments of Attorneys Fees " Utah Admin Code R. 25-14-3 (2002) (the 
"administrative rule" or "rule"). The Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees provides 
payment of set amounts upon the happening of certain events, such as appointment of 
counsel by a district court, and timely filing of a petition for post-conviction relief Utah 
Admin. Code R. 24-14-4 (2002). In addition, the rule provides separate and additional 
payment for "reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of $20,000.00 in any one 
case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants." Utah Admin. 
Code R. 25-14-3 (2002). 
Shortly after the district court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief and 
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a Motion to Require 
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Government to Pay for Transcripts, Printing, and Cost for Appeal and a Motion to 
Appoint Rule 8 Qualified Counsel for Appeal. (R. 3990-91). Even though the Division 
had paid petitioner all the required amounts for "the legal services performed and 
litigation costs incurred,'1 petitioner argued that he was entitled to additional and separate 
payment of ordinary, routine legal costs under the rule's $20,000 allotment for 
investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants. (R. 3792-3799). 
The Division filed a memorandum opposing petitioner's motions. (R. 3830-35). 
The Division argued that according to the plain language of the rule and its harmony with 
the statute, petitioner agreed to accept the payments already made as full compensation 
for both the costs of counsel and reasonable litigation expenses. (R. 3830-35). Since 
petitioner did not request payment for expenses of court approved investigators, expert 
witnesses, or consultants, the Division argued, he was not entitled to any additional 
payment. (R. 3830-35). 
Nevertheless, Judge Brian granted petitioner's motions and ordered the Division to 
pay for all transcripts, printing, and costs that the petitioner deems necessary to perform 
the post conviction appeal separately from, and in addition to, the legal fees and other 
payments the Division already made to petitioner. (R. 3904-09). Judge Brian concluded 
that the "rule fails to separate 'costs of counsel' from 'otherreasonable litigation 
expenses,'" and, therefore, the rule "is too narrowly written to represent the statute." (R. 
3908). Judge Brian also concluded that the Division was required to pay for any 
6 
transcript petitioner deemed necessary for his appeal. (R. 3909). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in three respects. First, the trial court erred in ruling that 
the Division's administrative rule conflicts with the governing statute. The statute 
expressly requires payment of "costs of counsel" and "reasonable litigation expenses," 
but does not require separate payment of those expenses. The administrative rule 
provides separate sets of payments for: (1) expenses for legal services performed and 
litigation costs incurred; and (2) expenses, up to a total of $20,000 in any one case, for 
court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants. The rule is consistent 
with the statute because it does not abridge, enlarge, or extend the statutory provisions. 
Rather, it only provides the procedures for paying the required statutory expenses. 
Petitioner agreed to accept the payments made for both legal fees and litigation costs. 
Because petitioner is not asking for payment of investigators, expert witnesses, or 
consultants, he is not entitled to any additional payments. 
Second, the court failed to afford the Division's application and interpretation of 
the rule any deference. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (the "Act") expressly 
empowers the Division to administer its provisions. Accordingly, the Division's 
interpretations of the operative provisions of the Act must be rationally based and should 
be set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, or are beyond the 
tolerable limits of reason. It is reasonable and rational for the Division to provide 
directions for the time and manner of payments to cover the statutorily enumerated 
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expenses. The statute describes what expenses are to be paid from state funds, while the 
rule describes the procedure for making payment to cover those expenses. The Division's 
decision to pay both costs of counsel and litigation costs through a single set of payments 
is not arbitrary or capricious, and is not beyond the tolerable limits of reason. 
Finally, the district court erred in allowing petitioner's legal counsel carte blanche 
to order any transcript, regardless of its relevancy, and in requiring the Division to pay for 
irrelevant transcripts. If required to pay for litigation expenses separately and in addition 
to costs of counsel, the Division should be required to only pay for transcripts that are 
relevant to and part of the Rule 60(b) appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RULE CONFLICTS 
WITH THE STATUTE. 
Menzies ("petitioner") has collaterally attacked his conviction of kidnapping and 
aggravated murder by filing a petition for post-conviction relief A petition for post-
conviction relief is a civil matter. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Defendants pursuing post-
conviction appeals are not constitutionally entitled to legal counsel. Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Treffv, Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, 26 P3d 212. Nonetheless, in 
post-conviction appeals the Utah Legislature has provided for both the appointment and 
payment of legal counsel for indigent defendants in capital post-conviction proceedings: 
Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in 
providing representation [in post-conviction petitions] shall be paid from 
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state funds by the Division of Finance according to rules established 
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c) (West 2004) (the "statute"). 
To meet the statute's mandate, the Division of Finance (the "Division") 
promulgated Utah Administrative Code Sections R. 25-14-1 through 6 (the "rule" or 
"administrative rule"). Absent extraordinary circumstances, the rule provides for two 
separate sets of payments to cover costs of counsel and litigation expenses. The first set 
of payments covers "legal services performed and litigation costs incurred." Utah 
Admin. Code R.25-14-3 (2002) (providing that "all appointed counsel agree to accept as 
full compensation for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred, the 
amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees found in Section R25-
14-4").l The second set of payments covers "reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed 
a total of $20,000 in any one case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and 
consultants." Utah Admin. Code R. 25-14-5 (2002) (emphasis added). 
Although petitioner has received all amounts for which he qualifies, he argues that 
the rule cannot be read literally to include payment for ordinary litigation expenses within 
the first set of payments.2 He argues instead that ordinary litigation expenses such a copy 
1
 The Schedule of Payments provides $5,000 upon appointment by the district 
court, $5,000 upon timely filing of a petition for post-conviction relief, $10,000 after 
completion of discovery, $5,000 for evidentiary hearings, and $7,500 upon the filing of a 
brief and remittur. 
2
 Importantly, petitioner does not challenge the rule's payment amounts and caps in 
this appeal. Nonetheless, any issue of the rule's payment caps is not properly before the 
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and deposition transcript costs should be paid from the second set of payments, even 
though these costs admittedly are not of investigators, expert witnesses, or consultants. 
Even though petitioner never argued that the rule conflicts with the statute, the trial court 
ruled that the rule conflicts with the statute because "it fails to separate 'costs of counsel' 
from "other reasonable litigation expenses/" The court ordered the Division to pay 
petitioner's printing, copy, and deposition transcript costs from the second set of 
payments. This ruling is in error because the rule is entirely consistent with the statute. 
A. The rule's express language is entirely consistent with the statute's 
requirement that costs of counsel and reasonable litigation expenses for 
indigent defendants convicted of capital crimes be paid from state funds. 
It is well-established that "an agency's rules must be consistent with its governing 
statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm V?, 846 P.2d 
1304, 1306 (Utah 1997); see also West Jordan v. Dep't of Employment Security, 656 P.2d 
411,412 (Utah 1982); SF Phosphates Limited Co. v. Auditing Div., 912 P.2d384, 385 
(Utah 1998); Crossroads Plaza Ass 'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 1197, 965 (Utah 1996). A rule 
that is "in conflict with the express provisions of a statute would in effect amend that 
statute." Id. A rule is invalid only "when [it] nullify[s] or waive[s] the provisions of 
statutory law." Id.; see also Draughon v. Department of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT 
App 42, 975 P.2d 935 (holding that a rule is inconsistent with a statute only if it abridges, 
Court because petitioner has not petitioned to amend the current rule as required by 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (West 2004). Moreover, petitioner has not 
exhausted his administrative remedies on this issue. 
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enlarges, extends, or modifies the statute). A rule, therefore, is consistent with the statute 
and must be applied as written if it does not '"confer greater rights or disabilities' than the 
governing statute." Morgan County v. Holnam, Inc., 2001 UT 57, f 10; 29 P.3d 629, 631 
(quoting SF Phosphates, 972 P.2d at 386). A rule carries a presumption of validity when 
determining whether the rule is consistent with governing statutes. South Central Utah 
Tel Ass'n, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 951 P.2d 218, 223 (Utah 1997); Newspaper Agency 
Corp. v. Department of Workforce Services, 1999 UT App 222,1f 12, 984 P.2d 399, 402. 
In interpreting a statute to determining whether a rule is consistent with its 
provisions, a court first looks to the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature. 
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^  7; 31 P.3d 528, 529; Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy 
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (holding that "when language 
is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left 
for construction"). Generally, "rules made in the exercise of a power delegated by the 
statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if possible, an effectual 
piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason." Crossroads 
Plaza, 912 P.2d at 965; Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \ 7 (ruling that a rule should be read in 
harmony with the governing statute so that the rule is acceptable); McKnight v. State Land 
Board, 381 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1963) (ruling that "[rjules made in the exercise of a 
power delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if 
possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound 
11 
reason"). 
In the analogous case of Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Department of Workforce 
Services, 1999 UT App 222, 984 P.2d 393, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the 
Department of Workforce Service's administrative rule authorizing appellate filings at 
various employment centers was consistent with the governing statute. The 
administrative rule was consistent with the statute because it "describes who must receive 
the appeal, while the rule describes a procedure for how this may be accomplished." 
Id. at \ 13. The court determined it was reasonable and rational for the Department in its 
administrative rule to "flesh out direction for the time, place, and manner of filing an 
appeal." Id. at \ 14. The Department's rule was entirely consistent with the statute, the 
court concluded, because it "simply effectuate[s], and thus do[es] not contradict, the 
statutory goal of providing notice of an intent to appeal to the Division of Adjudication." 
Id. at f 14; see also SF Phosphates, 972 P.2d at 386 (concluding that a Tax Commission 
rule defining the term "mining" was consistent with the governing statute and rejecting a 
the argument that the mining must have one definition for all tax-related purposes and 
must be defined broadly); Morgan County v. Holnam, 2001 UT 57, 29 P.3d 629 
(concluding that Tax Commission's rule defining "new and expanding operations" to 
include an increase in plant production or capacity consistent with the governing statute). 
In contrast, the Utah Court of Appeals in Fussell v. Department of Commerce, 815 
P.2d 250, 254 (Utah Ct App. 1991), ruled that the Department's rule imposing licensing 
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requirements on psychologists was inconsistent with the governing statute because it 
"imposes additional requirements for psychologist licensure that are not contained within 
the plain meaning of the statutory language/' Specifically,"[r]ather than administering 
the former statutory requirement for psychologists through clarifying regulations, the 
Division effectively amended it, by creating stricter educational requirements than the 
statute contemplated." Id.; see also Airport Hilton Ventures, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 7i, 1999 UT 26, 976 P.2d 1197 (concluding that the Tax Commission exceeded its 
power to assess sales and transient room tax as authorized by the governing statute by 
promulgating a rule that added other criteria to the statute determining taxability). 
The rule in this case is entirely consistent with the express language of the statute. 
Construing the statute and rule in harmony, the statute enumerates what expenses are 
covered, while the rule provides procedures for how those expenses are paid. The statute 
simply requires the payment of "[cjosts of counsel and other reasonable litigation 
expenses." Similar to the statute in Newspaper Agency Corp., the statute is silent on the 
time, manner, and amount of payments to cover costs of counsel and litigation expenses. 
The rule therefore provides prescribes the time, manner, and amount of payment. 
The rule pays for "legal services performed and litigation costs incurred," from one set of 
payments, and "reasonable litigation expenses . . . for court approved investigators, 
expert witnesses, and consultants" from a second, separate set of payments. The rule pays 
a set amount for legal services performed and litigation costs incurred upon the happening 
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of certain, objective events, such as $5,000 upon appointment of counsel, $5,000 upon 
proof of timely filing of a petition, and $ 10,000 after all discovery is completed. Payment 
of investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants, on the other hand, is paid upon court 
approval and is capped at $20,000. In contrast to Fussell, the rule does not impose 
additional or stricter requirements than the statute. Rather, it simply provides procedures 
to carry out the statutory mandate. Accordingly, the rule is entirely consistent with the 
statute. 
B. The administrative rule is consistent with the statute even if it contains non-
substantive differences in wording. 
A rule is not invalid simply because it contains some minor differences in wording 
from the controlling statute. The Utah Supreme Court has rejected the notion that minor 
wording differences from a statute invalidate a rule. See Lay ton City v. Glines, 616 P.2d 
588 (Utah 1980). In Glines, the court rejected an argument that a city ordinance 
penalizing persons driving while intoxicated contained an invalid inconsistency because 
the city failed to amend the ordinance consistent with amendments made to the 
controlling state regulation. 616 P.2d at 588. The ordinance differed from the state 
regulation only in the absence of any provision dealing with subsequent conviction for 
driving while intoxicated and the penalties prescribed for injuries inflicted while 
operating a vehicle in a proscribed manner. Id. at 598. Although the court acknowledged 
differences between the state regulation and ordinance, it concluded that those differences 
did not amount to an "invalidating inconsistency." Id. The court pointed out that "'[i]n 
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determining whether an ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether 
the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice 
versa.'" Id. {quoting Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671, 673 (Utah 1938)). The 
ordinance was valid even though it did not encompass all the proscriptions of the state 
regulation because it did not permit or forbid anything beyond the statute. Glines, 616 
P.2d at 588; see also Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(concluding no invalidating inconsistency between a city DUI ordinance and state statute 
and ruling that a "municipal ordinance need not be identical to the controlling state statute 
to be consistent with it"). 
The rule in this case uses key terms of art and concepts that are not only 
synonymous with, but are virtually identical to those used in the statute. The statute 
requires payment of "costs of counsel" and "reasonable litigation expenses." The rule 
provides payment for "legal services performed and litigation costs incurred." Both the 
statute and rule, through the first set of payments, provide payment of legal fees and 
ordinary litigation costs such as the printing, copy, and deposition costs. Just as in Glines, 
the rule and statute are in complete harmony because, even though the language is slightly 
different, the rule does not permit or forbid payment of any expense not expressly 
enumerated by the statute. Rather, both the rule and statute provide payment for legal 
fees and routine litigation expenses. In short, the rule and statute are consistent regardless 
of minor differences in terminology between the rule and statute. 
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C, Not only is the rule consistent with the language of the statute, it is also 
consistent with the intent of the statute. 
In addition to being consistent with the express language of the statute, the rule is 
also entirely consistent with the intent of the statute. The statute's intent simply is not 
undercut by the rule's current payment provisions. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act's (the "Act") intent is to "establish a 
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies . . . ." Utah Code Ann, § 
78-35a-102 (West 2004). To help accomplish the Act's intent, the statute provides for the 
appointment and payment of legal counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases. 
Rather than direct the manner in which payments are made or the amount of expenses 
covered, the Legislature expressly directed the Division to promulgate rules to administer 
payment of the enumerated expenses. 
Consistent with the Legislature's direction, the rule's express intent is to "establish 
the procedures and maximum compensation amounts to be paid for attorneys fees and 
litigation expenses by the Division of Finance." Utah Admin. Code R, 25-14-1(2) (2002), 
Accordingly, the rule describes the manner in which payment for expenses will be made 
and in what amounts; it does not, however, enumerate what expenses will and will not be 
paid. 
The rule also acts in concert with the statute to accomplish several public policy 
goals. First, the rule places responsible limits on the expenses of individual defendants 
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while at the same time serving the greater public interest by providing taxpayer funding 
for post conviction proceedings. 
Second, the rule allows for quick, effective, and consistent administration. The 
rule provides payment of legal fees and ordinary litigation expenses on the happening of 
specific, objective events. Legal counsel need only provide proof of the event. Only the 
extraordinary expenses of investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants requires court 
approval. This payment mechanism allows legal counsel the discretion to most 
effectively use the funds provided. Legal counsel know, up front, the amounts available, 
when those amounts will be paid, what expenses will be covered, and what is required for 
payment. 
Finally, the rule effectively removes the Division from any decision-making on the 
merits of a particular expense. The rule allows assigned legal counsel to make decisions 
on costs and expenses without the oversight of a government agency. By providing 
procedures for payment, the rule simply helps carry out the statutory intent, and it is 
consistent with the statutory goal of providing funds for effective representation of 
indigent defendants convicted of capital crimes. 
II. THE DIVISION'S RULE AND DECISION TO PAY COSTS OF COUNSEL 
TOGETHER WITH REASONABLE LITIGATION EXPENSES IS 
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL. 
The standard of review applied to an agency's interpretations of the operative 
provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer is an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Minings 2001 UT 112, 
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% 17; 38 P.3d 291, 297 (emphasis added); SF Phosphates Limited Co. v. Auditing Div., 
972 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1998) (ruling that an agency's interpretation of its own rules are 
reviewed for reasonableness). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, 
agency interpretations must be rationally based and are set aside only if they are arbitrary 
and capricious or beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Associated. Gen. Contractors, 
2001 UT 112, ^ J 17. An agency's interpretation of the statutory law it is empowered to 
administer is 
limited to situations where the agency has been granted explicit or implicit 
discretion under the statute, where the agency possesses expertise 
concerning the operative provisions at issue, or where the agency is 
otherwise in a better position than the court to assess the law due to its 
experience with the relevant subject matter. 
Id. 
The statute at issue here is the prototypical example of an explicit grant of 
discretion to an agency. The statute expressly provides that "costs of counsel and 
reasonable litigation expenses . . . shall be paid from State funds by the Division of 
Finance according to rules established pursuant to [the] Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c) (West 2004). Not only does the statute 
explicitly grant the Division the discretion to promulgate rules, the Division possesses the 
expertise to administer the statute's payment provisions. Indeed, the Division's core 
responsibility and expertise is to control, account for, and pay state funds. The Division 
not only routinely pays expenses incurred by indigent defendants convicted of capital 
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crimes, but also from similar funds it administers, such as the Indigent Defense Fund. See 
e.g. Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ^  19 (concluding that it was within the 
State Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining's expertise to define terms by rule using geological 
rather than economic terminology). Because of the statute's explicit grant of authority, 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is the correct standard to apply in 
interpreting and applying the rule. See Id. 
When interpreting an administrative rule, courts use standard rules of statutory 
construction. McKnight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1963); Brendle v. 
City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "Rules made in the exercise 
of a power delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if 
possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound 
reason." McKnight, 381 P.2d at 73 L 
In the analogous case of Associated General Contractors, the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that an administrative rule promulgated by the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining that 
defined terms using geological rather than economic terminology was valid because it 
was consistent with the controlling statute. 2001 UT 112, \ 26. It was rational and 
reasonable, the court concluded, for the Board to use geological terminology to define key 
terms because, in part, the governing statute itself used geological terminology to define 
terms and the administrative rule simply followed the definitional framework established 
by the governing act itself. Id. at f^ 26. The court also applied an arbitrary and capricious 
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standard of review because the governing statute expressly allowed the Board to enact 
rules necessary to carry out the purpose of the governing statute. Id. at \ 19. 
Similarly, in Newspaper Agency Corp., the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that "[i]t 
was reasonable and rational for the Department [of Workforce Services] to flesh out 
directions for the time, place, and manner of filing an appeal." 1999 UT App 222, f 14. 
Therefore, the rule was entirely consistent with the governing statute because it 
"prescribed the permitted methods for filing an appeal with the Division" whereas the 
statute described who must receive the appeal. Id. 
Associated General Contractors and Newspaper Agency Corp. command the same 
result in this case. The rule could not be more clear: "all appointed counsel agree to 
accept as full compensation for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred 
the amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees found in Section 
R25-14-4." Utah Admin. Code R. 25-14-3 (2002) (emphasis added). It is not only 
reasonable and rational for the Division to supply directions that provide the time and 
manner for paying expenses, it is required by the statute itself. Petitioner's argument that 
he is entitled to separate, additional payments to cover ordinary litigation expenses from 
the funds set aside for expert witnesses, consultants, and investigators simply is not 
supported by the plain language of the rule. 
The Division interprets and applies its rule as providing payment of costs of 
counsel and ordinary litigation expenses such as printing, copying, and transcript costs 
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together from the first set of payments. This interpretation and application is reasonable 
and rational and the rule should be applied as written to petitioner. 
Nonetheless, the reasons for the rule's payment structure and mechanism are many, 
but all provide a reasonable and rational basis for the rule. First, the payment of a set 
amount to cover both legal fees and litigation expenses allows legal counsel for indigent 
petitioners to control and direct those funds, rather than burdening both legal counsel and 
the Division with the need to submit each and every bill of various expenses for payment. 
Legal counsel is thereby placed in the preferred position of deciding how to best use the 
allotted funds. 
Second, because the Division is not involved in the merits of virtually ail post-
conviction proceedings, payments of ordinary expenses are triggered upon the happening 
of objective events. The rule generally does not require any qualitative assessment by the 
Division of particular expenses, but only requires a signed request for payment verifying 
the happening of the event. 
For extraordinary expenses of investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants that 
may require some qualitative assessments, the rule requires court approval.3 The rule 
thereby allows assigned legal counsel to make decisions regarding specific expenses 
without the oversight of a government agency that has no context of the underlying 
3
 Payment of ordinary expenses from the funds reserved for investigators, expert 
witnesses, and consultants, would require court approval, whereas under the correct 
interpretation of the rule, those ordinary expenses do not. 
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proceedings. It also eases administration of the statute's payment provisions, and 
provides consistency and objectivity.4 Just as in Associated General Contractors and 
Newspaper Agency Corp., the Division's decision to provide one set of payments to cover 
both costs of counsel and ordinary litigation expenses is reasonable and rational.5 
III. THE DIVISION IS NOT REQUIRED TO PAY FOR IRRELEVANT COSTS, 
INCLUDING COPYING COSTS OF IRRELEVANT TRANSCRIPTS, IF 
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL SUMS FOR PRINTING 
AND OTHER COSTS 
In ruling that petitioner is entitled to additional payments for litigation expenses, 
the district court ruled that it "is not here to step in the shoes of Petitioner's counsel." 
Thus, the court allowed petitioner to "choose to use [the $20,000 available for 
investigators, consultants, and expert witnesses] on post-conviction appeal expenses as 
she deems necessary to perform her duty as counsel." Under the current rule, however, 
the payments provided allow legal counsel wide discretion to use the funds allotted and 
does not require the Division or a court to step into the shoes of legal counsel. 
4
 Petitioner's interpretation, on the other hand, would create redundancy, and 
would effectively provide an additional, unforseen avenue for payment of litigation 
expenses. Under petitioner's interpretation, legal counsel would be entitled to payments 
for costs of counsel and litigation expenses from the first set of payments, payment for 
expert witnesses and consultants from the second set of payments, and separate, 
additional payments for litigation expenses also from the second set of payments. 
5
 Had the Division meant that ordinary litigation expenses be paid from the set of 
funds reserved for investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants, it would have used 
exemplary language rather than exclusive, limiting language. The rule does not use the 
nonexclusive terms "for example" or "such as." The rule specifically enumerates 
payments for investigators, experts witnesses, and consultants only. 
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Nonetheless, should the Division be required to pay petitioner additional amounts 
for litigation expenses from the second set of payments, it should only be obligated to pay 
for those transcripts properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion proceedings. In any 
appeal, the record consists of "[t]he original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the 
transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the 
docket sheet." Utah Rule App. P. 11(a). Petitioner may only appeal the trial court's 
denial of rule 60(b) relief. Accordingly, petitioner may only designate the transcripts 
from the rule 60(b) proceedings for his post-conviction appeal. As this Court has 
previously ruled in the related post-conviction appeal, if the Division is required to pay 
additional sums for copies of transcripts, it is only obligated to pay for those transcripts 
properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion proceedings. (Appendix "B"). The Division 
should be under no obligation to pay for transcripts that are irrelevant to the rule 60(b) 
motion proceedings and that were not properly referenced in those proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should vacate the trial court's order and remand 
for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 day of December, 2004. 
JOEL A. FERRE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
78-35a-202. Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty cases. 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has 
been affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing 
scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the death warrant, of the provisions 
of this chapter allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the 
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. 
(2) (a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine 
whether the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record regarding the 
defendants indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly 
appoint counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as 
required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record 
by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the 
rejection. 
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in providing the 
representation provided for in this section shall be paid from state funds by the Division 
of Finance according to rules established pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
R25-14-L Authority and Purpose. 
(1) This rule is implemented pursuant to Section 78-35a-202. 
(2) The purpose of the rule is to establish the procedures and maximum compensation 
amounts to be paid for attorneys fees and litigation expenses by the Division of Finance to 
legal counsel appointed by district courts to represent indigent persons sentenced to death 
who request representation to file an action under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. 
R25-14-2, Request for Payment 
In order to obtain payment for attorney's fees and litigation expenses, counsel appointed 
by a district court, pursuant to Section 78-35a-202(2)(c), shall present to the Division of 
Finance a certified copy of the district court order of appointment of legal counsel and a 
signed Request for Payment verifying the work has been performed as provided in 
Section R25-14-4 pursuant to the schedule of payments set forth in that section. 
R25-14-3. Scope of Services. 
(1) All appointed counsel, by accepting the court appointment to represent an indigent 
client sentenced to death and by presenting a Request for Payment to the Division of 
Finance, agree to provide ail reasonable and necessary post-conviction legal services for 
the client, including timely filing an action under the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 35a, 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act and representing the client in all legal proceedings 
conducted thereafter including, if requested by the client, an appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
(2) All appointed counsel agree to accept as full compensation for the legal services 
performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments 
of Attorneys Fees found in Section R25-14-4. 
R25-14-4. Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees. 
All counsel appointed to jointly represent a single client shall be paid, in the aggregate, 
according to the following schedule of payments upon certification to the Division of 
Finance that the specified legal service was performed or the specified events have 
occurred: 
(1) $5,000.00 upon appointment by the district court and presentation of a signed 
Request for Payment to the Division of Finance. 
(2) $5,000.00 upon timely filing a petition for post-conviction relief. 
(3) $10,000.00 after all discovery has been completed, all prehearing motions have been 
ruled upon, and a date for an evidentiary hearing has been set. 
(4) If an evidentiary hearing is required, $5,000.00 on the date the first witness is sworn. 
(5) $7,500.00 if an appeal is filed from a final order of the district court. $5,000.00 of the 
total shall be paid when the brief on behalf of the indigent person is filed and $2,500.00 
when the Utah Supreme Court finally remits the case to the district court. 
(6) An additional fee of $100 per hour, but in no event to exceed $5,000.00 in the 
aggregate, shall be paid if: 
(a) counsel satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration; 
and 
(b) the district court finds: 
(I) that the appointed counsel provided extraordinary legal services that were not 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of accepting the appointment, such as responding to or 
filing a petition for interlocutory appeal, and 
(ii) the services were both reasonable and necessary for the presentation of the client's 
claims. 
(c) These additional fees shall be paid upon approval by the district court and compliance 
with the provisions of this rule. 
R25-14-5. Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses. 
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of 
$20,000.00 in any one case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and 
consultants. Before payment is made for litigation expenses, the appointed counsel must 
submit a request for payment to the Division of Finance including: 
(1) a detailed invoice of all expenses for which payment is requested; and 
(2) written approval of the district court certifying that the expenses were both reasonable 
and necessary for the presentation of the client's claims. 
R25-14-6. Withdrawal of Counsel. 
(1) If an attorney appointed under Section 78-35a-202 is permitted to withdraw by the 
court or, due to death or disability, is unable to continue, the attorney shall be paid only 
for the actual work performed to the date of withdrawal as certified by the court. 
(2) If withdrawal is ordered by the court because of counsel's improper conduct or the 
court finds that a foreseeable conflict of interest which should have been disclosed prior 
to appointment existed, all compensation received by the attorney shall be repaid to the 
Division of Finance. 
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Appellant, 
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CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Time 
Case No. 20040289-SC 
Appellee. 
ORDER 
Before the Court is Appellee's motion to strike Appellant's 
designation of record. The motion is denied in part and granted 
in part. The State shall be required to provide a transcript for 
each hearing described by affidavit to be submitted by 
Appellant's counsel to the district court. The affidavit shall 
specify the manner in which each hearing was referenced during 
the rule 60(b) proceedings and its relevance to those 
proceedings. For purposes of plenary review of the denial of the 
rule 60(b) motion, this court will only consider those record 
materials properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion 
proceedings. In the event this Court finds that a transcript was 
not referenced during the rule 60'b) proceedings, but Appellant's 
counsel nevertheless required its production pursuant to 
affidavit, Appellant shall be required to reimburse the State for 
the costs of procuring the transcript. Appellant's motion for 
costs and attorney fees is denied. 
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FOR THE COURT; 
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Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on June 30, 2004, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
ELIZABETH HUNT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1018 E MILLBERT AVE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106 
ERIN RILEY 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY 
ATTN: KAREN EELLS 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
Dated this June 30, 2004. 
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Case No. 20040289 
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY, 030106629 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, RULING AND ORDER 
Petitioner, 
vs Case No 030106629 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison 
Judge PAT B BRIAN 
Respondent 
The above post conviction case comes before the Court for decision on Ralph Leroy 
Menzies' ("Petitioner" or "Appellant") Petitioner's motion to strike the Division of Finance ("the 
Division") response and objection to Petitioner's request for transcripts and designation of record 
and the Division's opposition to Petitioner's motion to strike 
BACKGROUND 
On April 21, 2004, the Court granted Petitioner's motion for the Division to pay for 
transcripts, printing and other costs of appeal, as deemed necessary by Petitioner's counsel On 
April 26, 2004, the Division filed an appeal challenging the Court's decision On May 4, 2004, 
Petitioner filed a notice of cross-appeal On May 11, 2004, Petitioner filed his request for 
transcripts and designation of record On May 18, 2004, the Division filed it response and 
objection to Petitioner's request On May 20, 2004, Petitioner filed her opposition and motion to 
strike On May 28, 2004, the Division filed its opposition to Petitioner's motion to strike The 
parties did not request oral argument 
On June 30, 2004 the Utah Supreme Court issued an Order granting in part and denying 
m part the State of Utah's motion to strike Petitioner's designation of record The Court stated in 
relevant part 
The State shall be required to provide a transcript for each hearing described by 
affidavit to be submitted by Appellant's counsel to the district court The 
affidavit shall specify the manner in which each hearing was referenced during the 
rule 60(b) proceedings and its relevance to those proceedings For purposes of 
plenary review of the denial of the rule 60(b) motion, this court will only consider 
those record materials properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion proceedings 
In the event this Court finds that a transcript was not referenced during the rule 
60(b) proceedings, but Appellant's counsel nevertheless required its production 
pursuant affidavit, Appellant shall be required to reimburse the State for the costs 
of procunng the transcript 
ANALYSIS 
Based upon the Utah Supreme Court's order and the Division's memoranda, along with 
other documents in this case, it appears that Petitioner's motion to require the Division to pay for 
all thirty-three (33) transcripts, given the narrow issue on appeal may be excessive However, in 
a Rule 60(b) motion the final step m the analysis is whether there is a meritorious claim Here, 
the motion for summary judgment that Petitioner tried to set aside by his Rule 60(b) motion, 
relates to one claim, whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel at Petitioner's trial and 
direct appeals If the final prong of the Rule 60(b) motion is addressed by the Utah Supreme 
Court, then the thirty-three (33) transcripts may be relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner's 
remaining claim has merit Nevertheless, as stated by this Court before, "The Court is not here to 
step in the shoes of Petitioner's counsel" The Utah Supreme Court has ordered Petitioner's 
counsel to file an affidavit specifying what hearings were referenced in the Rule 60(b) 
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proceedings and the relevance of those hearings in the Rule 60(b) proceedings and Petitioner's 
counsel may request transcripts accordingly 
Based upon the discussion above, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motion to strike. 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS Petitioner's counsel to file an affidavit as detailed and ordered by 
the Utah Supreme Court and an amended request for transcripts and designation of record . 
DATED this J £ _ day of ( j yy/^s , 2004 
By the Court
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 030106629 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail THOMAS B BRUNKER 
ATTORNEY RES 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH #600 
P.O. BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84114-0000 
Mail JOEL A FERRE 
ATTORNEY RES 
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH, 5TH 
FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 140857 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84114-0857 
Mail ELIZABETH HUNT 
ATTORNEY PET 
3194 S 1100 E STE 202 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106 
Dated this 2c. day of 2 0 ^ 
Deputy Couft Clerk 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
[N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
RALPH LEROY MENZ[ES, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, 
vs Case No 030106629 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison 
Judge PAT B BRIAN 
Respondent 
The above post conviction case came before the Court for hearing on Ralph Leroy 
Menzies' (Petitioner) (I) motion to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel for appeal, (2) motion to 
order payment of Brass deposition transcript bill, (3) motion to require government to pay for 
transcripts, printing and costs for appeal and (4) cross motions to extend time for filing notice of 
appeal 
At the hearing, the Court granted the parties cross motions to extend time for filing notice 
of appeal and the Court took the remaining three motions under advisement The Court 
considered the parties oral arguments and reviewed the parties briefs, applicable constitutional, 
statutory, case law and rules and now renders the following decision on the remaining three 
motions 
BACKGROUND 
This case has a long protracted history, which the Court does not provide here 
Following is a very brief history of the case On March 8, 1988, Petitioner was found guilty of 
first degree murder, a capital offense, and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in the 
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death of Maunne Hunsaker Petitioner directly appealed the merits of his conviction The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction 
On April 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post 
Conviction Relief On December 7, 2002, the Court granted Respondent's motion for summary 
judgment on Petitioner's petition On January 11, 2002, the Court dismissed Petitioner's petition 
for post conviction relief 
Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment On February 26, 2004, the 
Court denied Petitioner's motion to set aside 
I 
MOTION TO APPOINT RULE 8 QUALIFIED COUNSEL FOR APPEAL 
Petitioner now seeks to have Rule 8 qualified counsel appointed for appeal relating to his 
post conviction petition Petitioner argues that he has a right to appeal this Court's denial of the 
motion to set aside summary judgment Citing Utah Constitution, Article 1 § 11 and 12, Article 8 
§ 5, Utah Code §§ 77-I-6(I)(g), 77-l8a-l(b), and 78-35a-110, Utah R Civ P 65C(o) and 60(b) 
Petitioner claims that the Utah Code contemplates that Rule 8 qualified counsel will be appointed 
to represent indigent capital defendants in post-conviction cases, and will be paid by the Division 
of Finance Citing Utah Code § 78-35a-202, UtahR Cam P 8 Furthermore, Petitioner argues 
that the Utah Administrative Code governing capital post-conviction cases contemplates that 
post-conviction counsel will continue to provide "all reasonable and necessary post-conviction 
legal service" and will be paid to complete an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court Citing Utah 
Adm Code §§ 25-14-3(1), see also 25-14-2, 25-14-4(5) Petitioner claims that the Court's 
failure to appoint counsel to pursue his right to appeal would violate his due process rights 
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Petitioner argues that given the complexity of capital post-conviction litigation, it would be 
unfair to expect Petitioner, an indigent death row inmate with no law library, to represent 
himself Petitioner argues that it is in society's best interest to appoint counsel because of the 
unique and unalterable nature of the death penalty Moreover, Petitioner argues that there is no 
substantial prejudice or injustice that will befall the Respondent by granting Petitioner a fair 
opportunity to exercise his rights through counsel on appeal 
It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel for his trial and m 
Utah, pursuant to statute for direct appeals of his conviction of certain crimes See Utah Code § 
77-32-301 et seq , but see Douglas v California, ill U S 353 (1963) However, that is not the 
case before the Court Here, Petitioner launched a collateral attack of his conviction by filing his 
post conviction petition, a civil matter 
The issue, therefore, is whether Petitioner is entitled to appointment of Rule 8 qualified 
counsel for his post conviction appeal 
Upon review of federal and state law, the Court concludes that a constitutional right to 
counsel does not extend to a post conviction petition appeal, which is a civil matter 
Pennsylvania v Finley 481 U S 551,555 (1987) citing Johnson v Avery, 393 U S 483 (1969), 
Wainwright v Torna, 455 U S 586 (1982), Ross v Moffitt, 417 U S 600 (1974), see also Treffv 
Hinckley, 16 P 3d 212 (Utah 2001), Walker v Carlson, 740 P 2d 1372 (Utah App Ct 1987) 
Although there is no constitutional right to counsel for post conviction petition appeal, 
the Utah state legislature has enacted the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code §§ 78-35a-
101 et seq (the Act) providing appointment of counsel for post conviction proceedings 
Here, the State does not oppose Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel based 
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upon law of the case. This Court previously appointed Petitioner's counsel and found her to be 
Rule 8 qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases The Court also 
previously and still finds Petitioner to be indigent 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's motion to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel 
for appeal. 
II 
MOTION TO ORDER PAYMENT 
OF BRASS DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT BILL and 
MOTION TO REQUIRE GOVERNMENT TO PAY 
FOR TRANSCRIPTS, PRINTING AND COSTS 
The two remaining motions raise the same issue of whether Petitioner is entitled to 
payment of transcripts, printing and other costs associated with his post conviction appeal. 
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to payment of transcripts, printing and other costs 
associated with his post conviction appeal pursuant to the Act, § 78-35a-202; Rule 8; Utah Code 
§§ 25-14-2; 25-14-4(5). Petitioner argues that for his counsel to be effective she must present his 
case using the record, which includes transcripts and other costs. Since Petitioner is indigent, he 
cannot bear this expense and counsel should not have to either. Petitioner argues that the 
legislature has provided that the Division of Finance should pay for these expenses. 
The Division of Finance (the Division) filed a response to Petitioner's motions. The 
Division argues that although the Division is the entity charged by statute to pay the costs of 
counsel for indigent defendants pursuing post conviction remedies pursuant to the Act, the 
Division has already provided Petitioner the payments to which he is entitled. Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act R25-14-3 provides that "[a]ll appointed counsel agree to accept as 
full compensation for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts 
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oo; 
provided m the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees found in Section R25-14-4 " (The 
schedule ) The Division argues that the only additional payments provided by the Rule are for 
"reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of $20,000 in any one case for court 
approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants " Utah Adm R 25-14-5 The 
Division argues that it interprets its rule as plainly written that payment made under the schedule 
is to cover the legal service performed and litigation costs incurred The Division argues that the 
Petitioner has received all payments under the schedule for which he has qualified and these 
payments are to cover reasonable litigation expenses, e g , transcripts, printing, filing fees etc 
Section 78-35a-202 provides 
(2)(a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall 
determine whether the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record 
regarding the defendant's indigency If the court finds that the defendant is 
indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent 
defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation 
expenses incurred m providing the representation provided for in this section shall 
be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance 
The statute specifically provides that "costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation 
expenses shall be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance " The Division's 
rules are a promulgation of the statute The rule fails to separate "costs of counsel" from "other 
reasonable litigation expenses " The rule is too narrowly written to represent the statute The 
statute separates expenses for "costs of counsel" from "other reasonable litigation expenses" and 
so does the Court Post conviction attorney's are already rare and the attorney's fees are not 
enough to cover expenses for transcripts, printing and other costs associated with post conviction 
appeals Post conviction appeals clearly requires transcripts, printing and other expenses, 
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therefore, there is no dispute that those are "reasonable expenses11 incurred in providing 
Petitioner's representation. However, from oral arguments, it is apparent that there is dispute 
regarding how many transcripts are necessary to perform Petitioner's post conviction appeal 
The Court is not here to step in the shoes of Petitioner's counsel. Petitioner's counsel knows the 
limited amount available for post conviction litigation under the Division's rules, therefore, she 
may choose to use that money on post conviction appeal expenses as she deems necessary to 
perform her duty as counsel. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's motion to order payment of Brass 
deposition transcript bill and motion to require government to pay for transcripts, printing and 
costs for appeal 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS; 
Petitioner to submit an Order for Appointment of Counsel; 
Petitioner to submit an Order to Pay for Transcripts, Printing and Costs. 
The above Orders should be filed, after stipulation by the State, ^ f l M ^ t e t ^ j i g n . 
DATED this^/dayof flL^AJS . 2004.^ 
By the Court; V; % 
PAT B. BRIANS ^ ^ . - j , 
Third District C o u r t ^ i ^ j i ^ > # # 
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ftO.^09 
ELIZABETH HUNT (#5292) 
Attorney for Mr Menzies 
PO Box 9419 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84109-0419 
Telephone (801)706-1114 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison 
Warden 
Respondent. 
ORDERS TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
AND FOR STATE TO 
PAY FOR TRANSCRIPTS 
AND COSTS OF APPEAL 
Case No 030106629 
JUDGE BRIAN 
Whereas, this matter came on for hearing before this Court on March 25, 2004, 
upon the Petitioner's motion to appoint Rule 8 qualified counsel for the appeal from this 
Court's February 26, 2004 order denying relief from the summary judgment, and upon 
Petitioner's motions to require the State to pay for the transcript of the January 13, 2004, 
deposition of Edward K. Brass and for the transcripts, printing and other costs on appeal 
The Court has fully considered the motions and memoranda and arguments of the 
parties. 
Based upon the Motions of Petitioner, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. 
i ^ U *_ 
» W - 5 AMH: 17 
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I Elizabeth Hunt is found to be Rule 8 qualified to represent Menzies in his 
appeal from this Court's February 26, 2004 order denying relief from summary judgment, 
and is hereby appointed to complete the appeal. 
2. The State of Utah, Division of Finance, is hereby ordered to pay the CitiCourt 
bill for the January 24, 2004, deposition of Edward K. Brass. 
3. The State of Utah, Division of Finance, is hereby ordered to pay for transcripts, 
printing and other costs of appeal as deemed necessary by c^pMH^r^p^wner 
Dated this M day of -X?\ • » ^ 
Approved as to form: 
THE HONORJfcptE; 
JUDGE OF T H ^ f y ^ ^ 
ssistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was e-mailed and 
mailed to: 
Joel Ferre 
Heber Weils Building 
160 East 300 South 
Box 140857 
Salt Lake UT 84114-0857 
and to: 
Ralph Menzies 
003328 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
this April 23, 2004 
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